All the visible notions of the above campaign group it seems to me are intended towards, a continuation of the main political narrative of the UK Government and Establishment battling 'the big EU' over "the way the British do things with plucky spirit and much vim," in Britain but reluctantly accepting 'the coolly, rational case' for conceding some powers to a Supranational EU.
This has been a constant of the British Government since the early 1960's and Vote Leave it seems to me continue this two-faced role of the UK Government looking both to Brussels at the same time as talking a "different game" to the UK Electorate: Controlling THEM.
Brexit The Movie: More "plucky crap."
Some brief examples:-
- Fake figures around the NHS
- Johnson's appeal to Nazis/Hitler
- Bonfire of Regulations
- Sheer Confidence alone will conquer negotiations
- Waving the Immigration Stick for agitation effect
- Authority
- Competence
- Comparison of sources of prestige
Likewise on the Remain side we've had an endless parade of prestige:-
- Barack Obama (President of the USA)
- Jeremy Corbyn (Labour leader)
- Mark Carney (Bank of England Governor)
- Christine Lagarde (Managing Director of the IMF)
- David Cameron, Gordon Brown, John Major (past and present PMs)
What I find remarkable is that for many people who don't feel confident about voting due to their information and knowledge levels, then they will tend towards resisting notions of:-
- Take Then Give in preference to Give Then Take ("Give & Take")
What's been neglected is the case to build up that the EU is doing the TAKING:-
Boris Johnson generates more bubble politics/Babel-17 from citing Hitler instead of holding up this paper concerning the EU's future plans or indeed it's key proponents preferences for it's members.
From such a position, we should see that the UK has been a generous and benefactor nation to the EU since we joined in the early 1970's and has GIVEN a lot to the EU. But it's time for the UK to take a commanding role on the Single Market outside the Political Union and thereby give the world a boost to trade and positive global influence. Given the EU has chosen to take more powers, it's time for it to GIVE goodwill back to the UK if the UK chooses democratically to leave: Quoting Dr. RAE North at EUReferendum.com:-
"The oddest thing of all is that, in devising our original scenario, we adopted the line taken by the British negotiating team in its successful attempt to enter the European Community in 1972.I think Dr. North's logic is sound. But as important I'd extend, the attitude is cooperative and the communication is simplified and hence: The problem of LEAVING the EU is above all else:
In his report on the negotiations, Con O'Neill wrote a very telling piece on how he came to define his strategy. "First", he said:
…almost every conceivable Community policy or rule or enactment is the resultant of a conflict of interests between the members, and has embedded in it features representing a compromise between these interests. Open it up at any point, and the whole laborious compromise will fall apart …On this basis, the character of the negotiations became one of leaving "relatively minor" matters to be settled after the UK had joined the Community while, in order to expedite the negotiations, the governing precept became, "Swallow the lot …".
Second, as in all negotiations, exceptions are dangerous, for they create precedents. Admit a change in this or that case, just because British arguments are strong and you will find it hard to resist changes in other cases where the matter is vital. So the two facets of the Community's principle became embodied in one precept: "Swallow the lot, and swallow it now".
Given the two-year time limit and "sudden death" character of the Article 50 negotiations, which would determine the exit settlement for the UK, it seemed to me that the precept which had facilitated our entry could do equal services in assisting us to leave the EU.
My reasoning in this respect was entirely straightforward. It would be far better to gain an exit settlement which was less than optimal than to end up with the catastrophic outcome of leaving without an agreement.
Furthermore, and crucially, I took that view that, unless we were able to show that compromise was possible, we would never secure the confidence of the electorate, and their support in the referendum. In effect, we either convinced the electorate that we were prepared to compromise on our exit expectations, or we would lose the referendum.
Such insight, of course, stems to a very great part from the intensive labour, with Christopher Booker, in researching and writing The Great Deception. And you might have thought that this might afford us some authority when it came to defining the referendum strategy."
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